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COMMENTS
AN INDIGENT ACCUSED DOES NOT HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL AT EXTRADITION HEARINGS: AN
ANALYTICAL APPROACH
While the United States Supreme Court has developed two dis-
tinct tests to determine when an indigent has a right to counsel in
a judicial proceeding, it has never specfically considered
whether an indigent accused enjoys this right in an extradition
proceeding. Courts which have addressed the issue have refused
to recognize this right without providing an adequate discussion
of the Supreme Court's tests. This comment examines the na-
ture of the extradition process, applies the two constitutional
tests, and concludes that no right to a pointed counsel exists
under either the sixth amendment or the due process clause of
the Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of courts in the United States hold that an indigent
accused does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel dur-
ing extradition' hearings.' This rule was embraced by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Utt v. State. I Other state courts have consist-
ently applied this rule despite an increased recognition of the impor-
tance of the assistance of counsel,4 and that an accused is subject to
arrest, detention, and delivery to the demanding state through the ex-
tradition process. 5
In determining whether an indigent accused has a constitutional
right to appointed counsel during extradition proceedings, most courts
have failed to employ an in-depth analysis of the right to counsel.
Rather, these decisions are based upon the restrictive characterization
of extradition as a summary proceeding, the right to counsel as attach-
ing to "critical stages" of the criminal prosecution, and conclusory rea-
l. Extradition is "[t]he surrender by one state or country to another of an individual
accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, de-
mands the surrender." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (5th ed. 1979). This
comment examines the process of extradition between states, i.e., interstate
extradition.
2. Utt v. State, 293 Md. 271, 284, 443 A.2d 582, 588 (1982).
3. 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582 (1982).
4. The Utt court indicated that several Supreme Court decisions, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), signaled the increasing recognition of the impor-
tance of counsel. Utt, 293 Md. at 276, 443 A.2d at 585.
5. See Note, Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel in Interstate Extradition Proceed-
ings, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Counsel].
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soning. This comment begins with the proposition that the right to
counsel always deserves greater attention than courts have given it on
this issue. From this proposition, this comment critically analyzes the
extradition process, the right to counsel, and the decisions rejecting a
constitutional right to counsel at extradition. Finally, by applying right
to counsel "tests" to the extradition process, this comment concludes
that the right to counsel should not extend to extradition.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Interstate Extradition
The extradition clause of the United States Constitution provides:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another
State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.6
Since the extradition clause is not self-executing,7 implementation is
provided by Congress.' In addition, although interstate extradition is
primarily a federal matter, most states have adopted legislation to facil-
itate the federal provisions.9
The purpose of the extradition clause is to prevent any state from
becoming an asylum for an accused sought by another state.' The
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
7. Constitutional provisions which are not self-executing require implementing legis-
lation. Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 708 (1903); Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 104 (1860).
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182-3195 (1970). The main extradition provision states:
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory de-
mands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of
any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and pro-
duces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a mag-
istrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with
having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic
by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from
whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the
State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him
to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making
such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the
fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when
he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the
time of the alTest, the prisoner may be discharged.
Id. § 3182.
9. State v. Sinacore, 151 N.J. Super. 106, 112, 376 A.2d 580, 583 (1977). The Uni-
form Criminal Extradition Act, II U.L.A. CRIM. LAW & PROC. 51 (1974), has
been adopted by every state except Mississippi and South Carolina. Utt v. War-
den, 48 Md. App. 486, 493 n.6, 427 A.2d 1092, 1096 n.6 (1981), af'd, 293 Md. 271,
443 A.2d 582 (1982).
10. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Po-
lice, 245 U.S. 128, 132 (1917).
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clause is intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as
swiftly as possible in the state of the alleged offense." The process is
necessary to preserve both the harmony between the states and the law
and order within each state.12 To carry out these purposes, the scope of
inquiry permitted in the asylum state' 3 is very limited. For example,
the asylum state may neither inquire into the merits of the case 14 nor
question the guilt or innocence of the accused.' s
When the governor of the asylum state receives a proper demand' 6
from the governor of the demanding state, the only issues relevant to
whether the accused should be surrendered are: (1) whether the ac-
cused is the individual named in the demand; (2) whether the accused
is substantially charged' 7 with a crime' 8 in the demanding state; and (3)
whether the accused is a fugitive' 9 from justice.2 ° The responsibility
for determining these issues rests with the executive of the asylum state;
there is no prescribed method of determination or standard of proof.21
When Maryland is the asylum state, a governor's hearing is usu-
ally held as a matter of public policy 22 to determine these issues, but
this hearing is not constitutionally required.23 The governor may call
upon the attorney general to assist in investigating the demand.24 In
Maryland, the hearing is usually conducted by a special hearing officer
11. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978); Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90
(1952); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917).
12. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 102-03 (1860).
13. An asylum state is the state in which the fugitive is found, while a demanding
state is the state from which the fugitive has fled.
14. Wise v. State, 197 Neb. 831, 834, 251 N.W.2d 373, 376 (1977);Exparte Colier, 140
N.J. Eq. 469, 471, 55 A.2d 29, 30 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 829 (1948).
15. Smith v. Idaho, 373 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 919 (1967); In
re Maldonado, 364 Mass. 359, 362, 304 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1973); Wise v. State, 197
Neb. 831, 834, 251 N.W.2d 373, 376 (1977); Exparte Colier, 140 N.J. Eq. 469, 471,
55 A.2d 29, 30 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 829 (1948); see also MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 34 (1978).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 18 (1978).
17. Substantially charged means that the demand includes allegations sufficient to
constitute a crime in the demanding state, but the allegations need not conform to
the technical requirements of a criminal pleading. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387,
404 (1908); Exparte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 651 (1885).
18. A crime includes all offenses of the demanding state. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 103 (1860).
19. A fugitive is one charged with a crime in the demanding state who leaves that
state regardless of purpose or motive after the commission of the crime. Ap-
pleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906).
20. Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372 (1905); Hyatt v. New York ex rel Corkran,
188 U.S. 691, 710 (1903); Exparte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 649 (1885).
21. Exparte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 652 (1885).
22. MARYLAND EXTRADITION MANUAL 22 (N. Rogers ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
EXTRADITION MANUAL].
23. Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372 (1905); Haynes v. Sheriff, 253 Md. 278, 280-
81, 252 A.2d 807, 809 (1969).
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 19 (1978).
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appointed by the attorney general. Once the governor is satisfied that
the elements of extradition have been established, 26 he will issue a war-
rant of arrest. 27 This warrant raises the presumption that the accused is
the fugitive wanted, which in turn justifies the accused's arrest, deten-
tion, and delivery to the demanding state.28
Before being delivered to the demanding state, however, the ac-
cused has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge
his detention.2 9 The habeas corpus court may consider only the same
basic issues that were considered by the governor. 3° The scope of in-
quiry for the habeas corpus court is otherwise considerably restricted. 3
Furthermore, to overcome the presumption raised by the arrest war-
rant, the accused at a habeas corpus proceeding must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt either that he was not present in the demanding state
at the time of the alleged offense, or that he is not the person named in
the warrant.32
The Supreme Court's opinion in Michigan v. Doran33 provides an
insightful analysis of the purpose, scope, and character of the extradi-
tion process. By relying on the requirement that an affidavit must sub-
stantially charge the fugitive with a crime under the law of the
25. EXTRADITION MANUAL, supra note 22, at 22. A special assistant to the attorney
general is a proper person to conduct the governor's hearing. State ex rel Zack v.
Kriss, 195 Md. 559, 74 A.2d 25 (1950).
26. Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 709 (1903).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 22 (1978).
28. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 417 (1933); Compton v. Alabama, 214
U.S. 1, 8 (1909); Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372 (1905); Roberts v. Reilly,
116 U.S. 80, 95 (1885).
29. The habeas corpus hearing is the process by which the accused may challenge the
legality of his detention in a court of the asylum state. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 25 (1978); see generaly Note, Extradition Habeas Corpus, 74 YALE L.J. 78
(1964).
30. In reviewing a governor's grant of extradition, a habeas corpus court can do no
more than decide whether the extradition documents are in order, whether the
accused has been charged with a crime in the demanding state, whether the ac-
cused is the person named in the demand, and whether the petitioner is a fugitive.
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978).
31. A habeas corpus court may not inquire into whether probable cause exists for
arrest, id. at 282, whether the criminal prosecution pending against the accused in
the demanding state is legal, Garrison v. Smith, 413 F. Supp. 747 (D. Miss. 1976);
Commonwealth ex rel. Colcough v. Aytach, 227 Pa. Super. 527, 323 A.2d 359
(1974), whether the accused has been denied the right to a speedy trial, In re
Maldonado, 364 Mass. 359, 304 N.E.2d 419 (1973); Wise v. State, 197 Neb. 831,
251 N.W.2d 373 (1977), whether evidence should be suppressed, Thomeczek v.
Bray, 198 Colo. 341, 600 P.2d 66 (1979); Martin v. Maryland, 287 A.2d 823 (D.C.
1972), whether the statute of limitations has run, Biddinger v. Commissioner of
Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917), and whether the accused is fit to stand trial,
Mandarano v. Tierney, 151 Conn. 155, 195 A.2d 48 (1963); State v. Tyler, 398 So.
2d 1108 (La. 1981).
32. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 422 (1933); cf. McNichols v. Pease, 207
U.S. 100, 112 (1907) (clearly and satisfactorily); Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Cor-
kran, 188 U.S. 691, 711 (1903) (by conclusive evidence).
33. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
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demanding state, the Michigan court held that a habeas corpus court
may review the demanding state's finding of probable cause.3 4 The
Supreme Court disagreed,35 noting that allowing review of issues which
can be fully litigated in the charging state would defeat the purposes of
the extradition clause.3 6 According to the Court, these purposes are to:
(1) bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the demanding state;
(2) prevent any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives; and (3)
promote the principles of comity and full faith and credit. 37 The Doran
Court concluded by emphasizing that "[i]nterstate extradition was in-
tended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding ....
The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct
the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the
initial arrest and trial."38 Consequently, the Supreme Court held that
the asylum state may not review the probable cause determination
made by the demanding state.39
The Doran opinion is significant because it identifies the purposes
of the extradition clause and demonstrates that the scope of inquiry in
the asylum state is limited by these purposes. Furthermore, the opinion
indicates that the characterization of extradition as a summary,
mandatory executive proceeding is derived from the purposes of the
extradition clause itself.
B. The Right to Counsel During Extradition Proceedings
The Supreme Court has not considered whether an indigent ac-
cused has a constitutional right to appointed counsel during extradition
proceedings.4 ° Most state courts that have considered this issue have
declined to recognize the right at the governor's hearing. 4' The major-
ity of states have similarly declined to recognize a constitutional right
to appointed counsel at the habeas corpus proceeding.42 Other states
have held that any right to counsel during extradition would be statu-
tory and not constitutional.43
34. Id at 285.
35. id. at 286.
36. Id. at 290.
37. Id. at 287-88.
38. Id at 288.
39. Id. at 290.
40. Utt v. Warden, 48 Md. App. 486, 496, 427 A.2d 1092, 1098 (1981), afJTd, 293 Md.
271, 443 A.2d 582 (1982).
41. See Seymour v. State, 21 Ariz. App. 12, 515 P.2d 39 (1973); Powell v. State, 19
Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989 (1973); Rugg v. Burr, 1 Ariz. App. 280, 402 P.2d 28
(1965); Utt v. State, 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582 (1982); Rutledge v. Preadmore, 21
Mich. App. 726, 176 N.W.2d 417 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Coleman v. Cuyler, 261 Pa. Super. 274, 396 A.2d 394 (1978).
42. See Sullivan v. State, 43 Ala. App. 133, 181 So. 2d 518 (1965); Oppenheimer v.
Boies, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 948 (1964); Powell v. State,
19 Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989 (1973).
43. Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F. Supp. 184 (D. Nev. 1980); Wertheimer v. State, 294
Minn. 293, 201 N.W.2d 383 (1972); Roberts v. Hocker, 85 Nev. 390, 456 P.2d 425
JVol. 13
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The right to appointed counsel at the governor's hearing is denied
because of the summary nature of the proceeding." Consequently, ex-
tradition proceedings are not a "critical stage" of the criminal prosecu-
tion which would entitle an indigent to court appointed counsel under
the sixth amendment.45 The constitutional right to appointed counsel
at the habeas corpus hearing is denied for similar reasons and also be-
cause habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, not a criminal prosecution.46
According to at least one court that has rejected the right, the accused's
right to counsel is adequately protected by the assurance of the right in
subsequent proceedings.47
In Maryland, the accused has a statutory right to demand and pro-
cure legal counsel at the habeas corpus hearing.48 The court will ap-
point counsel at this stage if the accused is indigent.49 However, at the
governor's hearing there is no recognized constitutional or statutory
right to appointed counsel,5" although the accused may retain
counsel.5
Most courts that have considered whether an indigent is entitled to
court appointed counsel during extradition proceedings have summa-
rily disposed of the issue. A typical analysis is illustrated by the Court
of Appeals of Arizona in Powell v. State: 2
A governor's hearing. . . is a mere factual determination that
the person demanded is charged with a crime and is a fugitive
from justice. It is based upon the demanding state's sub mit-
ted requisition papers and is not an adversary proceeding.
(1969). Section 10 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition 'Act, 11 U.L.A-. CRIM.
LAW & PROC. 51 (1974), provides that the accused has the right to demand and
procure counsel at habeas corpus proceedings. Some courts have interpreted this
to include the right of an indigent to appointed counsel at habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Mora v. District Court, 177 Colo. 381, 494 P.2d 596 (1972); People ex.
re. Harris v. Ogilvie, 35 Ill. 2d 512, 221 N.E.2d 265 (1966); Rutledge v.
Preadmore, 21 Mich. App. 726, 176 N.W.2d 417 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915
(1971); Roberts v. Hocker, 85 Nev. 390, 456 P.2d 425 (1969); In re Turner, 410
S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). For a discussion of an indigent's right to
appointed counsel under the Uniform Criminal Extraditon Act, see Note, An Indi-
gent is Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel In a Habeas Corpus Proceeding Under
the Un!form Criminal Extradition Act, 27 MD. L. REV. 435 (1967).
44. See Rutledge v. Preadmore, 21 Mich. App. 726, 730, 176 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971); Commonwealth ex re. Coleman v. Cuyler, 261
Pa. Super. 274, 280, 396 A.2d 394, 397-98 (1978).
45. Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F. Supp 184, 187 (D. Nev. 1980); Roberts v. Hocker, 85
Nev. 390, 394, 456 P.2d 425, 428 (1969).
46. Oppenheimer v. Boies, 95 Ariz. 292, 299, 389 P.2d 696, 701, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
948 (1964); Powell v. State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 378, 507 P.2d 989, 990 (1973).
47. Rutledge v. Preadmore, 21 Mich. App. 726, 730, 176 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 25 (1978).
49. EXTRADITION MANUAL, supra note 22, at 25.
50. Utt v. State, 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582 (1982).
51. EXTRADITION MANUAL, supra note 22, at 23.
52. 19 Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989 (1973).
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One is not entitled to have counsel appointed at this stage. 3
The Court of Appeals of Maryland provided a more detailed ex-
amination of this issue in Utt v. State. " The court recognized that the
right to counsel attaches at the "critical stages" of the criminal prosecu-
tion." Ut also defined "critical stages" as those proceedings that could
impair a defense on the merits or when the accused is threatened with a
loss of liberty in a proceeding analogous to the criminal prosecution. 6
In applying this test to extradition, the court reasoned that because of
the summary nature of the extradition proceedings," basic rights are
not irretrievably lost, 8 and the deprivation of liberty does not occur in
a proceeding sufficiently analogous to a criminal prosecution. 9 Conse-
quently, the 0t court held that the governor's hearing is not a "critical
stage" of the criminal prosecution that would confer upon an indigent
the right to appointed counsel.6°
In light of the importance that should be given the right to counsel,
and the cursory examination used by most courts in determining
whether the right to counsel attaches during extradition, a detailed
analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions concerning the right to coun-
sel should be applied to the extradition process.
III. ANALYSIS
Two aspects of the right to counsel are relevant to a determination
of whether that right attaches to extradition proceedings. 61 First, the
sixth amendment of the Constitution62 guarantees the right to counsel
at "critical stages" of the criminal prosecution. 63 Second, the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments have also been
53. Id at 378, 507 P.2d at 990 (citations omitted).
54. 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582 (1982).
55. Id at 274, 443 A.2d at 583.
56. Id at 279, 443 A.2d at 586.
57. Id at 276, 443 A.2d at 584.
58. Id. at 285, 443 A.2d at 589.
59. Id at 279, 443 A.2d at 586.
60. Id. at 286, 443 A.2d at 589.
61. This comment does not address the fifth amendment provision of counsel embod-
ied in the prohibition against self incrimination. Eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of this topic in reference to extradition, see
generally Note, Miranda Safeguards Are Inapplicable to Interstate Extradition Pro-
ceedings or Habeas Corpus Hearings Instituted to Contest the Legality of Detention
for Extradition, 46 TEX. L. REV. 274 (1967). In addition, this comment also does
not address an equal protection argument since one may retain counsel during
extradition proceedings, see EXTRADITION MANUAL, supra note 22, at 24, but an
indigent is not entitled to appointed counsel.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, makes this right binding on the
states. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Reference to the
sixth amendment right to counsel in this comment includes its application to the
states.
[Vol. 13
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used to extend the right to counsel in certain non-criminal proceed-
ings.64 While most courts have employed sixth amendment analysis to
deny the right to counsel during extradition, 65 they have rarely ven-
tured into an analysis of the due process right to counsel when dealing
with extradition. The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Uf v. State66
analyzed several due process cases in denying the right to counsel at
extradition, but this was done under the guise of "critical stage" analy-
sis. 67 Because the sixth amendment and due process rights to counsel
demand separate modes of analyses, this comment will examine and
apply each to the extradition process.
A. The Right to Counsel in the Criminal Prosecution
The sixth amendment provides: "[iun all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense. '68 The right to counsel for criminal prosecution was
given greater emphasis in America 69 than in England, 7° and the right is
actually older than the Constitution itself.7 ' Until 1932, however, this
right was considered only in reference to retained counsel. In that year,
the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,7 2 held that in a trial for a
capital offense7 3 involving an indigent defendant 74 who is unable to
defend himself adequately,75 due process of law requires that the court
assign counsel to him.76
Although originally limited to its outrageous facts, 7 7 the Powell
64. See infra text accompanying notes 121-25. The term non-criminal proceedings
refers to those proceedings which do not constitute a criminal prosecution and to
which, therefore, the sixth amendment does not apply. Reference to the due pro-
cess right to counsel includes its application to the federal government and the
states.
65. See sources cited supra notes 47-49.
66. 293 Md. 271, 443 A.2d 582 (1982).
67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
69. See generally Comment, An HistoricalArgument For The Right To Counsel During
Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1030-31 (1964) (brief history of the right
to counsel in the American colonies).
70. See generally T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
331-33 (1868) (brief history of the right to counsel in England).
71. In at least twelve of the thirteen colonies, the right to counsel was fully recognized
in all criminal prosecutions except that in one or two instances the right was lim-
ited to capital offenses or other serious crimes. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
64-65 (1932).
72. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
73. A capital crime is one for which the death penalty may be imposed. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 189 (5th ed. 1979).
74. Refers to one who is unable to afford counsel. See id at 695 (indigent defendant).
75. The Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), indicated that a person is
unable to defend himself adequately when he is "incapable adequately of making
his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like
.... Id at 71.
76. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
77. Note, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Must Be Honored in All State or Local
19831
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holding was steadily expanded by the Court. The right to appointed
counsel was first extended to federal cases in which the accused's life or
liberty was in jeopardy,"8 and then to all capital cases.79 The right of
an indigent defendant to appointed counsel in non-capital state prose-
cutions, however, had a different development than in non-capital fed-
eral prosecutions.
In Betts v. Brady, 0 the Supreme Court originally rejected the
proposition that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the specific
guarantees of the sixth amendment which would have made that con-
stitutional provision binding on the states. Instead, the Court adopted
a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the particular trial was
conducted without the fundamental fairness required by fourteenth
amendment due process. 8' Twenty-one years later, by reasoning that
right to counsel is a fundamental prerequisite to a fair trial, the
Supreme Court overruled the Betts case-by-case approach in Gideon v.
Wainwright. 82 The Gideon Court held that the sixth amendment's right
to appointed counsel is obligatory upon the states through the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.83 Although Gideon involved
a felony offense, its holding was subsequently extended beyond the fel-
ony defendant to any defendant who is subjected to imprisonment for
any offense. 84
The right of an indigent defendant to court appointed counsel at
trial is based upon the concept that the right to be heard is fundamental
Criminal Actions That May Lead to Loss of Liberty, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 351,
353 (1970). An appropriate summary of these facts is found in Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 463 (1942):
[I]gnorant and friendless negro youths, strangers in the community,
without friends or means to obtain counsel, were hurried to trial for a
capital offense without effective appointment of counsel on whom the
burden of preparation and trial would rest, and without adequate oppor-
tunity to consult even the counsel casually appointed to represent them.
This occurred in a State whose statute law required appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants prosecuted for the offense charged.
78. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
79. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940).
80. 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
81. "[Wlhile want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in
such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment em-
bodies an inexorable command that no trial . . . can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel." Id. at 473.
82. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83. Id at 342.
84. In 1972, the Court held that a non-felony defendant who is charged with a crime
for which imprisonment may be imposed is entitled to appointed counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). The Court refined its holding
seven years later in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), when it held that a non-
felony defendant may not actually be sentenced to imprisonment without having
had the assistance of counsel. Id at 374; see generally Note, No Indigent Criminal
Defendant May Be Sentenced to a Term of Imprisonment Unless He Has Been Af-
forded the Right to Appointed Counsel, 56 N.D.L. REV. 434 (1980).
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to a fair trial.85 Without the assistance of counsel, the right to a hearing
is meaningless and a defendant cannot be assured of a fair trial.8 6 A
defendant, "unfamiliar with the science of law," is unable to make
knowledgeable decisions concerning the conduct of his defense and
trial.8 7
The Supreme Court has since held that because the right to assist-
ance of counsel is based upon the right to a fair trial, a defendant is
entitled to assert this right at any stage in the prosecution when coun-
sel's absence will deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.
88
These stages, which are characterized as "critical stages, "89 are those
pretrial procedures which may impair a defense on the merits, or other-
wise deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial if counsel is not
present.90
The Supreme Court established the "critical stage" test in Hamil-
ton v. Alabama. 9' In Hamilton, the defendant was arraigned without
the assistance of counsel.92 Under Alabama procedure, the defense of
insanity must be pleaded at arraignment or it is waived.9 3 The Court
held that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at this stage
because the events at arraignment in Alabama "may affect the whole
trial . . .[since] [a]vailable defenses may be irretrievably lost."94 Fur-
thermore, providing counsel at "critical stages" is a mandatory rule; a
court may not inquire into whether actual prejudice results when a de-
fendant is denied the assistance of counsel at a "critical stage." 95
In United States v. Wade,9 6 the Supreme Court extended the "criti-
cal stage" analysis beyond the irretrievably lost defenses test estab-
lished in Hamilton. The Wade Court, however, reaffirmed the
rationale that "critical stages" are those pretrial procedures at which
the absence of counsel will deprive the defendant of his right to a fair
85. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
86. See cases cited supra note 85.
87. Id
88. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 226-27 (1967); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
89. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961).
90. See cases cited supra note 89. Although this comment does not address the self
incrimination issue, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) ("critical stage"
when accused is not represented by counsel at a preliminary hearing and accused
enters a guilty plea which is later introduced as evidence), indicates that the "criti-
cal stage" test encompasses those judicial proceedings at which self incrimination
may occur.
91. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
92. Id. at 53.
93. Id
94. Id at 54.
95. Id at 55.
96. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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trial.9 7 In holding that the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of
the criminal prosecution, the Wade Court reasoned that the "critical
stage" test requires a court to:
[Sicrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to deter-
mine whether the presence of his counsel is necessa to pre-
serve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as afected by
his right to meangfully cross-examine the witness against
him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial
itself.98
Since the sixth amendment guarantees the right to counsel at those
stages of the criminal prosecution when the absence of counsel will de-
prive the defendant of his right to a fair trial, the two-step inquiry will
be used for purposes of the present analysis. Initially, it must be deter-
mined whether extradition is a stage of the criminal prosecution. If so,
the next question is whether the absence of counsel at extradition will
deprive an accused of his right to a fair trial.
For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that extradition is a
part of the criminal prosecution. First, extradition occurs after the de-
manding state has initiated the charging process.99 Second, extradition
is no more than the process by which the offender is brought for prose-
cution to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."co Finally, extradi-
tion is but one step in the resulting prosecution.' 0 '
The crucial inquiry therefore is whether the absence of counsel at
extradition will deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. ' 2 The
97. Id. at 227.
98. Id (emphasis supplied). Other important "critical stage" cases include Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), in which the Court determined that the Washington
deferred sentencing proceedings are a "critical stage" because, under Washington
law, the "absence of counsel at the imposition of the deferred sentence might well
result in loss of the right to appeal," id at 136, and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975), in which the Court held that "[blecause of its limited function and its
nonadversary character, the probable cause determination is not a 'critical stage'
in the prosecution that would require appointment of counsel." Id at 122.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970), requires that the demand for extradition be accompanied
by "a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made ... charging the person
demanded with having committed. . . [a] crime." C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 377 (1980), indicates that the criminal prosecution has already begun
when the charging process is undertaken. Professor Whitebread states that "[t]he
role of the charging grand jury is to determine whether there is probable cause to
proceed with the prosecution of a particular defendant." Id at 377 (emphasis
supplied).
100. An extradition proceeding, which occurs between the charging process and the
demanding state's pretrial procedures, is necessary only because the defendant is a
fugitive.
101. The analogy here is to the preliminary hearing of the criminal prosecution, which
is used to determine whether there is justification for detaining the defendant for
trial. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 99, at 33 1. Similarly, an extradition proceeding
determines whether there is a justification for delivering the defendant to the de-
manding state for trial.
102. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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absence of counsel at extradition may prejudice the defendant. For ex-
ample, if the accused waives his right to extradition, 03 fails to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus,"' 4 or waives any other extradition proce-
dures, °5 his right to those legal safeguards is lost. Just as a defendant
is unable to conduct his defense at trial because he is unfamiliar with
the law,1°6 an accused is unable to make informed decisions concerning
these issues at extradition. Furthermore, once extradited an accused
loses any right to a procedurally proper extradition since he is pre-
cluded from questioning the validity of the extradition once in the de-
manding state.'0 7 Without the assistance of counsel, the accused may
irretrievably lose his right to extradition and his right to a procedurally
proper extradition.
A "critical stage" entitling one to appointed counsel, however, is a
proceeding in the criminal prosecution at which the absence of counsel
will deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. The sixth amend-
ment does not confer the right to counsel to protect the defendant's
right to a fair pretrial proceeding unless that proceeding affects the trial
itself.' The only issues considered at extradition proceedings-
whether the accused is the individual named in the demand; whether
the accused is substantially charged with a crime in the demanding
state; and whether the accused is a fugitive from justice-are separate
from, and do not affect, the issues that will be considered at trial.'0 9
Since the absence of counsel at extradition does not prejudice the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial, it follows that extradition is not a "critical
103. See EXTRADITION MANUAL, supra note 22, at 21.
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 25 (1978).
105. Id. § 39.
106. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
107. See Note, Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 1049-50 nn.61-63.
108. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300 (1973), however, indicated that the right to counsel may attach to certain pre-
trial proceedings to protect the accused because these proceedings constitute trial-
like confrontations. Id. at 314. Even under this analysis, no right to counsel at-
taches at extradition because the proceedings are not analogous to many pretrial
proceedings and a trial-like confrontation. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282,
288 (1978).
109. Since extradition is a summary proceeding in the sense that the scope of inquiry is
limited, it is an important factor in denying the right to counsel at the proceeding.
This factor, however, is important only within the "critical stage" analysis and not
as a restrictive characterization. As summarized by the court of appeals in Utt v.
State, 293 Md. 271, 285, 443 A.2d 582, 589 (1982):
The Governor's rendition hearing fundamentally is a factual pro-
ceeding unconnected with guilt or innocence. Defenses need not be
raised. Basic rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost. The absence
of counsel will not impair defense on the merits. At the habeas corpus
hearing, where he does have counsel, the accused individual may bring
forward those contentions properly cognizable in his effort to avoid re-
turn to the place from whence he came. The rendition hearing is in
sharp contrast to those situations heretofore found to be critical stages of
criminal proceedings.
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stage" of the prosecution which would entitle the accused to appointed
counsel.
This conclusion finds support through a combined reading of two
Supreme Court cases, Gerstein v. Pugh "0 and Michigan v. Doran. "' In
Gerstein, the Court held that the right to counsel does not attach to a
proceeding at which the issue is whether there is probable cause to de-
tain a defendant." 2 Extradition, like the proceeding at issue in Ger-
stein, is a pretrial proceeding at which the decision is made whether to
detain a defendant for trial. Since Doran held that no probable cause
determination can be made during extradition proceedings," 3 it is logi-
cal that extradition is a proceeding of lesser legal significance than that
at issue in Gerstein. Since there is no right to counsel at a Gerstein
hearing, and because extradition is a proceeding of lesser legal signifi-
cance, the right to counsel should therefore not extend to extradition.
B. The Due Process Right to Counsel
Although the sixth amendment does not guarantee an indigent the
right to appointed counsel at extradition, the right to counsel should
also be analyzed on due process grounds.II
The due process clause provides that "[n]o State shall. . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' 'I
In In re Gault," 6 the Court addressed whether the right to counsel at-
taches to non-criminal proceedings. One issue in that case was whether
an indigent juvenile was entitled to court appointed counsel at a delin-
quency proceeding." 7 Under state law, the delinquency proceeding
was not a criminal prosecution that would entitle the accused to sixth
amendment rights." 8 Because the proceeding was essentially analo-
gous to a criminal prosecution," 9 the Court held that due process in-
cludes the appointment of counsel for indigent juveniles facing
110. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
111. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
112. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).
113. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
114. Two reasons demand analysis of the due process right to counsel. First, since
extradition is a proceeding which deprives the defendant of an interest within the
fourteenth amendment, see infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text, the accused
is entitled to due process of law. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). Second, extradition may not necessarily be a part of
the criminal prosecution. As such, the sixth amendment would not apply and the
due process right to counsel would be the only available right to counsel. For
example, it may be argued that extradition is not a part of the criminal prosecu-
tion because it results in arrest and detention separate from the criminal prosecu-
tion conducted in the demanding state.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fifth amendment contains a similar restriction
which applies to the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
116. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
117. Id at 34.
118. Id at 17.
119. Id at 36.
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delinquency proceedings at which the juvenile's freedom may be cur-
tailed. 2' In subsequent cases, the Court developed a balancing test to
determine whether due process requires the appointment of counsel.
Under this test, the initial determination is whether the proceeding
in question is subject to the requirements of due process. 121 The test
considers whether the nature of the individual's interest is encompassed
by the fourteenth amendment and whether the state is depriving the
individual of a life, liberty, or property interest as contemplated by the
amendment. 122 If so, to determine whether the process due includes
the right to counsel, 23 the individual's interest must be balanced with
the nature of the governmental interest. 24 When the individual's inter-
est in that right outweighs the governmental interest in denying it, 1
25
the right to counsel attaches to those proceedings.
The Court applied this test in Gagnon v. Scarpelli126 to determine
whether "an indigent probationer or parolee had a due process right to
be represented by appointed counsel at revocation proceedings."'' 27
The Court first noted that although revocation proceedings are not a
stage of the criminal prosecution, they may result in a loss of liberty
and, accordingly, the probationer or parolee is entitled to due process
protection. 12 In balancing the state and individual interests to deter-
mine whether the process due included the right to counsel, the Court
emphasized the need to protect the informal nature of the proceedings
and, therefore, rejected a per se right to counsel at revocation proceed-
ings.129 Recognizing that an individual may, in certain circumstances,
require assistance in presenting his version of disputed facts, 130 the
Court expressly rejected an inflexible rule regarding the right to coun-
sel and embraced a case-by-case determination.' 3 ' Finally, the Court
identified certain criteria which the state authority charged with ad-
ministering the probation or parole system should use in exercising its
discretion. 13
2
120. Id at 41.
121. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S 471, 481 (1972).
122. Id
123. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973).
124. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25, 43 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
125. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). For a discussion of the due process
right to counsel test, see generally Note, Probation and Parole-Right to Attorney
at Revocation Hearing: Are We Dragging Our Feet Toward Due Process and Equal
Protection?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 279 (1974).
126. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
127. Id at 783.
128. Id at 782.
129. Id at 786-87.
130. Id. at 787.
131. Id. at 790.
132. Id at 790-91.
The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final hearings are sus-
ceptible of almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion must
19831
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Another important case to address the due process right to counsel
in non-criminal proceedings is Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv-
ices. 33 In holding that due process does not require the appointment
of counsel in every parental status termination proceeding, the Lassiter
Court reaffirmed Scarpelli's case-by-case approach.'34  The Lassiter
opinion demonstrates the Court's trend toward adopting a case-by-case
approach when determining whether due process requires the appoint-
ment of counsel. Furthermore, the Lassiter decision provides greater
insight into the balancing test which determines whether the process
due includes the right to counsel. Here, the Court applied the three
factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge:35 (1) the nature of the pri-
vate interest affected by governmental action; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest created by the procedures used and the
value of additional safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, in-
cluding the fiscal and administrative burdens.136 These elements must
be weighed and then applied against the presumption that a right to
appointed counsel exists only if the indigent litigant faces a potential
deprivation of personal liberty.' 37  This test indicates that "as a liti-
gant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to ap-
pointed counsel."'
' 38
For purposes of the present analysis it must be determined
whether an accused facing extradition is entitled to due process of law,
and whether the balancing test, when applied to extradition proceed-
ings, requires that the process due include the right to counsel.
Extradition proceedings may result in the arrest, detention, and
be allowed the responsible agency in making the decision. Presump-
tively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where,
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or
parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i)
that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon
which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of
public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justi-
fied or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and
that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.
In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible
agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the
probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In
every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hear-
ing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the
record.
Id For a discussion of Gagnon, see generally Note, Criminal Procedure-A Previ-
ously Sentenced Probationer Is Entitled to a Preliminary Hearing, A State Is Not
Under a Constitutional Duty to Provide Counsel For Indigents in all Probation Rev-
ocations, the Need For Counsel Being Determinable on a Case-By- Case Basis, 51 J.
URB. L. 776 (1974).
133. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
134. Id at 31-32.
135. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
136. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
137. Id
138. Id at 26.
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delivery of the accused to the demanding state. The gravity of this type
of restraint on liberty was highlighted in Gerstein v. Pugh. 13 Although
Gerstein held that for fourth amendment purposes there is no right to
counsel at the probable cause determination, the Court remarked that
"pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income and impair his family relationships. Even pretrial
release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a
significant restraint on liberty."'"
Within the parameters established by the Court, this restraint is a
sufficient deprivation of liberty which entitles the accused to due pro-
cess of law."'4 The question remains, however, whether this individual
interest sufficiently outweighs the governmental interest so that the pro-
cess due includes the right to appointed counsel.
The principal governmental interests at extradition are derived
from the purposes of the extradition clause: (1) to prevent any state
from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives; (2) to promote the principles
of comity and full faith and credit; and (3) to bring offenders to trial as
swiftly as possible in the demanding state. 4 2 The presence of counsel
to protect the individual's interests during the legal determination (i e.,
whether the accused has been substantially charged with a crime) and
the factual determinations (i.e., whether the accused is the person
named in the demand and is a fugitive), would neither violate the prin-
ciples of federalism and state integrity nor allow the asylum state to
become a sanctuary for fugitives. These are issues reserved by the ex-
tradition process for determination in the asylum state. Similarly, since
these determinations are required by the extradition process, the pres-
ence of counsel to ensure proper resolution of the issues would not slow
the extradition process to an unreasonable extent. 4 3
The state also has an economic interest in that it wishes the extra-
dition determination "to be made as economically as possible and thus
wants to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of
lengthened proceedings his presence may cause."'" Lassiter makes
clear, however, that economy is not an overriding governmental inter-
139. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
140. Id at 114 (citations omitted).
141. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), indicates that the
defendant's interest in personal freedom triggers analysis for the due process right
to counsel. Id at 25. Furthermore, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), inti-
mates that the liberty interest entitled to due process protection is even broader
than freedom from bodily restraint. Id at 499.
142. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
143. Arguably, the presence of counsel at extradition could affect the "summary na-
ture" of extradition proceedings. As explained in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S.
282 (1978), however, since extradition proceedings are summary they do not vio-
late the purposes of the extradition clause. Because the presence of counsel would
not violate these purposes, the issue cannot be disposed of simply by reference to a
characterization derived from them.
144. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
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est when important individual interests are at stake.' 45 This is espe-
cially true when, as in the case of extradition, 46 the additional cost for
providing counsel may be characterized as de minimis. 147
At this point in the analysis, the individual's interest in protecting
his liberty seems to outweigh any governmental interest in denying the
right to counsel. The crucial inquiry for the due process right to coun-
sel test as applied to extradition, however, lies in the remaining factor
identified in Lassiter, ie., the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty
created by the procedures used.' 48
The only issues determined at extradition proceedings are whether
the accused is the individual named in the demand, whether the ac-
cused is substantially charged with a crime in the demanding state, and
whether the accused is a fugitive from justice. The nature of these is-
sues presents a minimal risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty since
they are easily determined by an examination of the submitted extradi-
tion papers. In essence, an accused may be extradited if the demanding
state has charged the accused with a crime and alleges facts sufficient to
constitute a crime in the demanding state. These determinations are not
as intricate as those for which the Court has recognized only a limited
due process right to counsel. For example, in Gagnon the Court indi-
cated that counsel should be provided at probation or parole revocation
proceedings if the accused denies committing the alleged violation or
offers some justification which would make revocation inappropri-
ate. 149 These contentions are analogous to determinations which may
have to be made at trial. In contrast, the scope of extradition proceed-
ing determinations cannot be analogized to most pretrial proceedings.
Extradition proceedings conducted by the asylum state cannot be "the
kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the ini-
tial arrest and trial."' 5 ° Since determinations made at extradition pro-
ceedings present a minimal risk of an erroneous deprivation of
liberty,' 5 1 the process due at extradition proceedings does not include
the right to appointed counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Extradition is the process by which a fugitive is delivered up to the
state charging him with a crime. In this process, the accused may be
subjected to arrest, detention, and delivery to the demanding state. De-
spite this restraint of personal freedom, most courts have summarily
145. Id
146. Utt v. State, 293 Md. 271, 294, 443 A.2d 582, 593 (1982) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
147. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
148. Id at 27.
149. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
150. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288 (1978).
151. It is important to bear in mind that the risk of erroneous deprivation refers to the
nature and scope of the proceeding in question. Extradition is the proceeeding at
issue here, not the subsequent prosecution in the demanding state.
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denied that an indigent has a constitutional right to appointed counsel
during extradition proceedings. A close analysis of Supreme Court de-
cisions regarding the right to counsel indicates that this conclusion is
reasonable. There is no right to counsel at extradition under sixth
amendment analysis since no determination made at those proceedings
deprives the accused of his right to a fair trial in the demanding state.
There is also no right to counsel at extradition proceedings under due
process analysis because the issues determined present a minimal risk
of erroneous deprivation of liberty.
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